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Epistemic perspective and online epistemic processing of evidence: Developmental 
and domain differences  
 
Abstract 
Relations between epistemic perspective and online epistemic processing of evidence when 
reading a text were examined. Thirty-seven young adolescents and 24 graduate university 
students were asked to read and think-aloud with two texts, one in the history domain and the 
other in the science domain. Participants also completed a prior-knowledge test and an 
instrument assessing their epistemic perspective. Results showed that participants who exhibited 
an evaluativist epistemic perspective and high prior-knowledge used the epistemic standard of 
scientific research more than participants who held non-evaluativist epistemic perspective. 
Furthermore, an age-related developmental difference was observed, with adults using the 
epistemic standard of scientific research more than young adolescents. Domain differences were 
observed in both participants’ epistemic perspective and online epistemic processing. 
Participants overall engaged in online epistemic processing of evidence more in the history topic 
than in the science topic. 
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1. Introduction 
Engagement in critical evaluation is considered one of the most desirable educational 
outcomes in the 21st century (NGSS Lead States, 2013). Critical evaluation is important for 
citizens who are not mere consumers of information but carefully weigh arguments before 
adopting or changing beliefs. Critical evaluation while reading a text involves evaluation of the 
arguments that are included in the text, such as examination of the claims and the evidence that 
support them (Walton, 1989). Evaluation of evidence has been examined in the literature under 
distinct lines of research. These include (1) argumentation, which focuses on argument 
construction, (2) argument evaluation, which focuses on comprehension and evaluation of 
arguments in the context of reading, and (3) epistemic cognition, which refers to “how people 
acquire, understand, justify, change, and use knowledge in formal and informal contexts” 
(Greene, Sandoval, & Bråten, 2016, p. 2).  
Evaluation can be cognitive or metacognitive in nature, depending on the object 
examined. According to Barzilai and Zohar (2014), “evaluation is cognitive when its object is the 
correctness or truth of speciﬁc knowledge claims and is metacognitive when its object is the 
thinking processes and standards used in cognitive evaluation of knowledge claims” (p. 20). Like 
Barzilai and Zohar (2014), we view evaluation of claims and evidence in a text as an epistemic 
cognitive process, falling under the general umbrella term of epistemic cognition. A large 
research literature indicates that individuals have difficulty engaging in critical evaluation of 
evidence (e.g., Iordanou & Constantinou, 2014; Sandoval & Millwood, 2005). One factor that 
might affect individuals’ engagement in evaluation is their epistemic perspective, which reflects 
individuals’ metacognitive knowledge, namely their “knowledge, beliefs, ideas, and theories 
regarding the nature of knowledge and knowing.” (Barzilai & Zohar, 2014, p. 20). Although 
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research thus far has focused on examining relations between individuals’ epistemic perspective 
and use of evidence in the context of argument production (Kuhn, 1991), knowledge regarding 
relations between individuals’ epistemic perspective and “online” epistemic processing, in 
particular in relation to evaluation of evidence, is very limited.  
Another factor that might also play a role in epistemic processing of evidence is 
individuals’ age-related developmental level. For example, earlier studies have shown a 
quantitative, as well as a qualitative growth in cognitive and metacognitive skill with age 
(Kitsantas & Zimmerman, 2002; Roderer & Roebers, 2014; van der Stel & Veenman, 2010; 
Veenman, Wilhelm, & Beishuizen, 2004). Yet, we do not have empirical evidence regarding 
potential age differences in the epistemic processing of evidence. A third factor might be the 
domain in which the evidence is presented. Indeed, the question of whether epistemic cognition 
is domain specific or domain general remains an open one (Greene et al., 2016; Muis, Bendixen, 
& Haerle, 2006). In addition, differences have been reported in individuals’ epistemic cognition 
about evidence between the social and the science domains (Iordanou, 2016), which might affect 
individuals’ epistemic processing of evidence in the social and science domains, respectively. 
As information rapidly increases and becomes more easily accessible via the internet, it is 
imperative to better understand how these factors, epistemic perspective, age, and domain, 
influence the evaluation of evidence (Sinatra, Kienhues, & Hofer, 2014). To address this issue, 
we examine the influence of epistemic perspective on young adolescents’ and adults’ 
engagement in evaluation of evidence during reading in history and science using a think-aloud 
approach. We examine online epistemic processing of evidence, that is individuals’ reflections 
about evidence during reading with an emphasis on evidence’s credibility, persuasiveness and its 
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role in the context of an argument. In doing so, we draw on the relevant theoretical frameworks 
of epistemic cognition and its relation to age and domain differences.  
1.1. Epistemic cognition  
Within the epistemic cognition literature, there are two main theoretical frameworks: the 
multidimensional approach and the developmental approach. The multidimensional approach 
conceptualizes epistemic cognition as a system of more-or-less independent beliefs (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997; Hofer, 2004; Schommer, 1994), whereas the developmental approach proposes a 
unidimensional developmental progression of epistemic cognition (King & Kitchener, 1994; 
Kuhn, 1991).  Several of the multidimensional frameworks that have been proposed share 
commonalities that can be categorized along four dimensions (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Two of 
these dimensions, (1) certainty of knowledge and (2) simplicity of knowledge, refer to the nature 
of knowledge. The other two dimensions, (3) source for knowing and (4) justification for 
knowing, refer to the nature of knowing.  
Recently, Chinn et al. (2011) proposed an expansion of the dimensions of epistemic 
cognition. For example, Chinn et al. suggested a finer-grained analysis of students’ beliefs about 
justification for knowing, focusing particularly on justiﬁcations based on evidence. For evidence, 
they proposed a deeper analysis of individuals’ speciﬁc evidential standards, such as what kind 
of evidence they consider as good evidence in a particular context. Our present work addresses 
this recommendation by examining individuals’ spontaneous evaluations of evidence in the 
context of a particular text. 
In the present study, we adopt the developmental approach of epistemic cognition 
because we are particularly interested in examining age-related developmental differences in 
epistemic cognition. According to this approach, the developmental task that underlies the 
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progression toward an evaluativist epistemic perspective, (e.g., that knowledge is actively 
constructed instead of passively received by authority figures) is the coordination of the 
subjective and objective dimensions of knowing (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). In this 
context, one’s epistemic perspective progresses from the absolutist level, to the multiplist level 
and then to the evaluativist level (Kuhn et al., 2000). In the absolutist level, the objective 
dimension of knowing dominates. Knowledge is conceived as an objective, external entity, 
which is knowable with certainty. In the mutliplist level, knowledge is no longer considered an 
object that is located in the external world, but a product of the human mind which is located in 
one’s self. At the multiplist level, the uncertain and subjective nature of knowledge come to the 
foreground and dominates one’s view of knowledge. At the evaluativist level, a balance is 
achieved between the objective and subjective dimensions of knowledge (Kuhn et al., 2000). A 
constructivist epistemic perspective involves the coordination of the subjective and objective 
dimensions of knowledge. Through evaluation, the position that is better supported by argument 
and evidence would be declared as the position that has more merits compared to alternative 
positions (Kuhn et al., 2000). Empirical studies, employing either the multidimensional or 
developmental approach, show evidence that one’s epistemic perspective changes with age and 
varies across domains. We discuss age-related developmental and domain differences in 
epistemic perspective next. 
1.2.  Age-related Developmental and Domain Differences  
The issue of domain specificity is an important issue on research in epistemic cognition 
(Greene et al., 2016). At the heart of the issue is to what extent beliefs vary across domains 
through the developmental trajectory and at what level of specificity beliefs should be considered 
across this trajectory (Muis et al., 2006). Are there age-related developmental differences in 
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levels of specificity? Given that the domain-specificity and even topic-specificity of epistemic 
cognition has been demonstrated in different empirical studies (Iordanou, 2010; Kuhn, et al., 
2000; Muis, Trevors, Duffy, Ranellucci, & Foy, 2016; Strømsø, Bråten, & Britt, 2011), this is 
clearly an important consideration for research on epistemic cognition. For example, Muis et al. 
(2016) found that secondary, college, undergraduate and graduate-level students held distinct 
epistemic cognitions about mathematics compared to psychology and everyday life. In another 
study, Kuhn et al. (2000) found differences in middle school students’, adolescents’ and adults’ 
epistemic cognition across different domains such as the physical science, social science and 
aesthetic domains.  
Epistemic cognition varies not only by context and content (Bråten, Britt, Strømsø, & 
Rouet, 2011; Kuhn et al., 2000), but also by age. There is evidence that an evaluativist epistemic 
perspective is more common among adults than children (Iordanou, Kendeou, & Beker, 2016; 
Kuhn, Iordanou, Pease, & Wirkala, 2008; Muis et al., 2016). For example, in Kuhn, Iordanou, et 
al.’s (2008) study, evaluativist epistemic perspective was more prevalent among teachers than 
among 6th grade students. Pertinent to this study is evidence supporting an association between 
an evaluativist epistemic perspective and the development of advanced thinking skills and 
learning (Mason, Ariasi & Boldrin, 2011; Muis & Franco, 2010; Stømsø, et al., 2011). Yet, this 
line of research does not inform our understanding of how epistemic perspective relates to 
learning and reasoning (Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl 2010). An association between epistemic 
perspective and online epistemic processing has been proposed to explain the relation between 
epistemic cognition and learning, which is discussed below. 
1.3. Epistemic Perspective and Online Epistemic Processing     
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To explain how epistemic cognition supports thinking and learning, some researchers 
proposed an association between epistemic beliefs and epistemic processing (Hofer, 2004; Muis, 
2007; Muis & Franco, 2010; Muis, Franco, & Gierus, 2011).  
1.3.1. Muis’ model.  In Muis’s model (2007) (1) epistemic beliefs constitutes one 
component of the cognitive and affective conditions of a task; (2) epistemic beliefs  influences 
the learning standards students set when goals are produced (e.g., standards for comprehension; 
“Do I know this?”); (3) epistemic beliefs translates into epistemic standards (e.g., standards 
about knowledge and knowing; “How do I know this?” or “Do I believe this?”) that serve as 
inputs to online epistemic processing; and, (4) self-regulated learning may play a role in the 
development of epistemic beliefs. Importantly, Muis proposed that epistemic beliefs influence 
the types of goals an individual sets for learning, the plans made for carrying out the task, the 
types of strategies used during learning, and how and to what extent epistemic processes are 
enacted. For example, a goal is modeled as a multifaceted profile of information (Butler & 
Winne, 1995) and each standard in the profile is used as a basis to compare the products created 
when engaged in the activity. The product is compared to the goal’s criteria via online epistemic 
processing. During learning, individuals evaluate the successes or failures of products created for 
the task, or perceptions about the self or context. Products created during learning are compared 
to the standards set via online epistemic processing. As such, key to evaluation is online 
epistemic processing. 
1.3.2. Kuhn’s model of epistemic cognition. In Kuhn’s (2001) model, epistemological 
understanding supports the process of knowing. Epistemological understanding determines 
whether knowing strategies, such as inquiry, analysis, inference and argument are executed. In 
particular, epistemological understanding informs intellectual values ─ that deal with questions 
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such as “Is there a point to arguing?” ─ and intellectual values, in turn, affect the disposition to 
apply strategies.  
Muis’ model focuses on epistemic beliefs, whereas Kuhn’s model focuses on 
epistemological understandings and suggests that individuals have tacit theories or perspectives, 
which incorporate these understandings (Barzilai & Weinstock, 2015). In the present work, given 
the different terminology used in the field of epistemic cognition, to avoid confusion (Greene, 
Sandoval, & Bråten, 2016) we use the term epistemic perspective throughout this paper, which is 
more reflective of the developmental approach.  
The relation between epistemic perspective and epistemic processing has attracted 
researchers’ interest recently, as it is reflected in the special issue on this topic which was 
published in “Metacognition and Learning” (2010). For example, Mason, Boldrin and Ariasi 
(2010) examined relations between the metacognitive activation of epistemic cognition during 
learning from the internet and individuals’ domain-specific self-reported epistemic perspective. 
Mason and colleagues examined middle school students’ self-reported epistemic perspective and 
their responses to interview questions about their searches on the Web. Results showed that 
beliefs in the complexity and tentativeness of knowledge correlated with reflections about the 
justification and uncertainty of knowledge. Similar findings have been reported by Strømsø and 
Bråten (2010) who found that undergraduate students who believed that knowledge claims need 
to be checked against other knowledge sources were more likely to report self-regulatory 
strategies of planning, monitoring, and regulation when using the Internet compared to students 
who believed that knowledge claims can be accepted without critical examination.   
1.3.3. Reflection on the methodological approaches employed in previous studies to 
study epistemic perspective and epistemic processing.  The studies described in section 1.2.2., 
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among others (e.g., Lin, Liang, & Tsai, 2012; Muis & Franco, 2010; Muis, Kendeou, & Franco, 
2011; Stahl, Pieschl, & Bromme, 2006), suffer from the same limitations as studies that explored 
relations between epistemic perspective and learning: They employed self-report measures to 
assess epistemic processing, which have notable psychometric problems (see Winne, Jamieson-
Noel, & Muis, 2002). Furthermore, research examining relations between epistemic perspective 
and epistemic processing examined epistemic processing after engagement in an activity, 
employing offline methods through retrospective interviews (e.g., Mason, et al., 2010) or 
questionnaires in which participants reported the frequency of engagement in epistemic 
processing in a particular course (Muis & Franco, 2010). Research examining epistemic 
processing using online methods, that is during engagement in an activity (e.g., Bannert & 
Mengelkamp, 2008), is limited (Hofer & Sinatra, 2010).  In the present work, we examine how 
individuals’ epistemic perspective influences the online epistemic processing of justification 
during reading of a text.  
Note that the focus of the present work is on online epistemic processing of justification 
of knowledge claims embedded within a text, rather than on abstract judgments regarding 
justification of knowledge or on justification of the trustworthiness of a text as a whole, which 
has been studied in previous work. For example, Strømsø et al. (2011) studied relations between 
undergraduate students’ topic-specific epistemic cognition and their judgments of the 
trustworthiness of a science text and a newspaper article, as well as the criteria they used to judge 
trustworthiness, through paper and pencil questionnaires. Results showed that students who 
believed that claims should be critically evaluated considered the science text as more 
trustworthy and reported that they used the criteria of their own opinion, author and content more 
than students who believed in relying on their own experiences for judging the trustworthiness of 
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the source. Bråten and colleagues also found a relation between students’ prior knowledge and 
judgments of trustworthiness (Bråten, Strømsø, & Salmerón, 2011). Relations have also been 
reported between justification of knowledge claims and memory of arguments when 
undergraduate students read articles presenting inaccurate arguments (Braasch, Bråten, Britt, 
Steffens, & Strømsø, 2014). In particular, justification of knowledge claims by personal opinion 
was negatively correlated with memory of arguments, whereas justification of knowledge by 
appealing to authority was positively related with memory of arguments. 
In another study, Ferguson and Bråten (2013) found that less knowledgeable secondary 
school students exhibited stronger beliefs in personal justification, whereas among more 
knowledgeable students some exhibited beliefs in justification by authority and others in 
justification by multiple sources. As the authors noted, a limitation of these studies is that 
“presenting participants with descriptions of each text, including source relevant information, 
and then explicitly asking them to rate the trustworthiness of each text as well as the importance 
of prelisted criteria, might have resulted in source evaluation not reflecting what participants 
would spontaneously do during normal reading” (Bråten et al., 2011, p. 190). According to Britt, 
Richter and Rouet (2014) “more research is needed to better understand the conditions under 
which readers will spontaneously and strategically evaluate content, what criteria they use, and 
how this is affected by the situation and materials” (p. 118). Taken together, there are a number 
of limitations from previous work that need to be addressed to better understand how epistemic 
cognition relates to learning and reasoning. Our study addresses the limitations observed in 
previous research and contributes to understanding how individuals evaluate evidence during 
reading, examining the epistemic criteria they use and how evidence evaluation varies by age 
and knowledge domain. 
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1.4. The Present Study 
 In the present study, we examine how individuals of varying ages (i.e., adolescents and 
adults) with different epistemic perspectives (i.e., absolutists, multiplists, evaluativists) engage in 
epistemic processing of evidence moment-by-moment during reading of texts, across two 
different domains (i.e., history and science). We examine online epistemic processes using a 
think-aloud methodology. The think-aloud methodology has been used in previous studies to 
explore relations between epistemic cognition and learning strategies when reading and problem 
solving (Greene, Yu, & Copeland, 2014; Hofer, 2004; Mason, Ariasi, & Boldrin, 2011; Muis, 
2008). We move beyond these studies by examining on-line epistemic processing focusing 
particularly on evidence. According to Chinn et al., (2011) “To understand actual learning 
processes, one needs measures that probe students’ more specific evidential standards” (p. 154). 
The think-aloud methodology is a measure that has the potential to reveal how participants 
approach evidence in a particular context.   
Our first research question was: Do individuals at different developmental levels of 
epistemic perspective and different prior knowledge differ in the "online" epistemic processing 
of evidence that they engage in when reading a text? Although there is evidence for an age-
related developmental progression in epistemic perspective (Kuhn, Iordanou, et al., 2008; Muis 
et al., 2016), our knowledge regarding this progression is limited. To address this gap in the 
literature, we examined a group of young adolescents and a group of adults. We hypothesized 
that evaluativists (Kuhn et al., 2000), who consider that knowledge is not certain and one view 
could be better than others, will engage in more epistemic processing of evidence than 
absolutists and multiplists (Hypothesis 1). Evaluation would be meaningless for absolutists, who 
consider that knowledge is certain and accessible from the external world, or for multiplists, who 
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consider knowledge as totally subjective and therefore approach all views as equally right. We 
further hypothesized that more epistemic processing would be observed for older compared to 
younger individuals (Hypothesis 2), given the evidence for better learning skills with increasing 
age (Roderer & Roebers, 2014; van der Stel & Veenman, 2010). We also included a test of prior 
knowledge to examine whether and how prior knowledge might influence online epistemic 
processing of evidence, given that earlier studies yielded contradictory results regarding the 
relation between prior knowledge and epistemic processing (Bråten, Strømsø, & Salmerón, 2011; 
Mason et al., 2010). Finally, we hypothesized that epistemic processing and prior knowledge 
would mediate the effect of age on epistemic processing (Hypothesis 3). 
The second research question was: Are there domain differences in epistemic perspective 
and epistemic processing of evidence? Previous work showed that epistemic perspective is 
domain- and even topic-specific (Kuhn, Iordanou, et al., 2008; Muis et al., 2006). In particular, 
domain differences have been reported in individuals’ epistemic knowledge regarding evidence. 
In Iordanou’s (2016a) study, elementary school students considered scientific data as central for 
knowledge acquisition in the science domain, whereas in the social domain personal experience 
was considered as meeting sufficient evidential standards. Yet, our understanding of how 
individuals evaluate information in different domains is far from complete (Mills, 2013). To 
address this issue, we examined two different knowledge domains, the history and science 
domains. Based on previous research, providing evidence for domain-specificity of epistemic 
perspective (Kuhn et al., 2000), we hypothesized that participants would exhibit different 
epistemic perspectives across the history and the science domains. In terms of epistemic 
processing, we hypothesized that since participants tend to view knowledge in the social domain 
as more subjective, and therefore amenable to human interpretation than knowledge in the 
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science domain (Iordanou, 2016a), they would engage in evaluation of evidence more in the 
history domain than in the science domain (Hypothesis 4).  
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
Sixty-one students from Cyprus, a small European country, participated.  The sample of 
young adolescents (N = 37, 23 females) included 18 first- and second-year secondary school 
students (13-14 year-olds) and 19 fifth- and sixth-grade elementary school students (11-12 year-
olds). Participants were randomly selected from public schools in a middle-class suburban area.  
The 24 graduate university students (mean age = 22 year-olds; N = 20 females) were first year 
students in a Master’s program in Educational Psychology in a small private university, who 
participated as part of a course requirement. Three students did not participate in the think-aloud 
procedure of the history domain and were therefore excluded from the analysis of the history 
domain. 
2.2. Materials 
2.2.1. Epistemic perspective instruments. To assess participants’ epistemic perspective 
in the history and science domains, the Livia and Fish problems (Kuhn, Iordanou, et al., 2008) 
were used. The Livia problem presented two contradictory accounts from two historians 
regarding the fictitious Fifth Livia war. The Fish problem presented two contradictory accounts 
from two scientists about the effect of eating fish on health. Participants were asked the same key 
questions in each case regarding (a) rightness − Can one view be more right than the other? − 
and (b) the certainty of knowledge − b1. Could anyone ever be certain about what happened in 
the Fifth Livia war [about the consequences of eating fish on health]? b2. What would help us 
become more certain?  
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2.2.2. History and science texts. Two short texts, one in the history domain and the other 
in the science domain, were used to engage students in learning. Each text presented two 
contradictory positions, along with supporting evidence for each position. The science domain 
text presented two contradictory reports about the causes of dinosaurs’ extinction (Iordanou, 
2010). One report claimed that dinosaurs were exterminated due to the collision of an asteroid 
with the Earth, whereas the other reported that dinosaurs gradually disappeared due to a series of 
giant volcanic eruptions. The text included 17 sentences (a total of 338 words). The history 
domain text presented two contradictory reports regarding the possible location of the historical 
island of Atlantis. One report claimed that the island of Atlantis was located in the Mediterranean 
Sea, whereas the other report claimed that it was located in the Atlantic Ocean. The text included 
19 sentences (a total of 382 words).   
2.2.3. Prior knowledge test.  A prior knowledge test was developed and administered in 
the present study. The prior knowledge test consisted of two open-ended questions, which asked 
participants to write what they knew about the topics of the two texts that were used in the study. 
In particular, the first question was “What do you know about the lost island of Atlantis?” and 
the second questions was “What do you know about dinosaurs’ extinction?” 
2.3. Procedure 
Participants participated in two 40-minute sessions. In the first session, participants 
completed the prior knowledge test and the two paper-and-pencil instruments assessing their 
epistemic perspective in the history and science domains, respectively. In the second session, 
participants were administered the history and science domain texts and were instructed to read 
and think-aloud. Participants were first trained to think-aloud with a short text and were 
prompted to think-aloud if they were silent for more than 4s. The order of presentation of the two 
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texts, as well as the administration of the two instruments assessing epistemic perspective, was 
counterbalanced across participants. The first session was group-administered, whereas the 
second session was administered individually and audio-recorded. 
2.4. Coding Schemes 
2.4.1. Epistemic perspective. Responses to all three questions ─ regarding whether one 
scientist can be more right than the other, whether anyone could ever be certain about what 
happened in the scenario described, and what would help us become more certain ─ were used to 
identify each participant’s epistemic perspective. The first two questions received Yes/No 
responses while the third one was an open-ended question. Participants’ responses on the final 
question regarding what would help us to become more certain were coded based on the coding 
scheme developed by Kuhn, Iordanou, et al. (2008).  Two coders, blind to the identity of the 
participants, coded all responses. Inter-rater reliability calculated with Cohen’s kappa was 0.87 
(p < .001) for the Livia problem and 0.89 (p < .001) for the Fish problem, indicating good inter-
rater reliability. Disagreements were resolved through discussion. Participants were classified as 
absolutists if they responded that one view could be more right than the other and certainty was 
empirically possible via direct observation of data or by asking a scientist or could be possible if 
we could overcome some practical limitations. Participants were classified as multiplists if they 
reported that one view could not be more right than the other and certainty was not possible 
because of the subjective nature of human knowing. Finally, participants were classified as 
evaluativists if they reported that one view could be more right than the other and certainty was 
not possible, but it could be approachable through investigation, analysis and interpretation of 
evidence. Table 1 presents participants’ epistemic perspective by age and domain.  
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2.4.2. Think-aloud protocols. Participants’ think-aloud episodes were transcribed 
verbatim and then parsed into clauses. Each clause was coded for evidence of epistemic 
processing (all participants’ statements were coded). All responses were coded by two coders 
using the coding scheme described in the Appendix, and percentage of agreement was 90%. 
Disagreements were resolved through discussion.  
 Epistemic processing statements were defined as statements about the evidence; this is in 
contrast to statements that constitute the evidence or are relevant to the content of the evidence. 
For example, the statement “in 1898, special equipment pulled to the surface of the Atlantic 
Ocean an islet which came from volcano land” was considered as evidence, whereas the 
statement “this evidence is not a proof that there was Atlantis” was considered as epistemic 
statement. Therefore, a first distinction was between epistemic processing statements and non-
epistemic processing statements. Another novel distinction followed where epistemic processing 
statements were further distinguished between high and low epistemic processing statements, 
based on whether they employed the epistemic standard of scientific research or not. High 
epistemic processing statements included statements that focused on evidence itself and 
statements that focused on the evidence’s role in the context of argument. The first case involved 
statements regarding evidence’s credibility, persuasiveness and rightness, along with justification 
based on scientific research. Note that evidence’s credibility in high epistemic processing was 
judged on whether there was an adequate amount of research supporting a piece of evidence or 
whether a particular piece of evidence was the product of research conducted with the scientific 
method. For example, statements such as “we need further research” and “so there are 
excavations and research studies which lead to this conclusion” were coded as high epistemic 
processing statements. The second case, which involved comments focusing on the evidence’s 
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role in the context of argument, included comments such as whether a particular piece of 
evidence supported the claim that it was supposed to support in the context of an argument. Low 
epistemic processing statements included comments regarding evidence’s credibility that were 
justified by epistemic standards other than scientific research, including the rule of majority, 
first-hand experience or authority alone, without weighing other forms of evidence (Greene, 
Azevedo, Torney-Purta, 2008).  
Comments regarding evidence’s persuasiveness and rightness with no accompanied 
justification, general comments (e.g. this is interesting), and simple reference to personal opinion 
(e.g. I agree with this) and to personal knowledge (e.g. I know this) were coded as low epistemic 
processing statements. Table 2 includes example comments of all the aforementioned categories. 
2.4.3. Prior knowledge test. Participants’ responses in the prior knowledge test were 
coded based on the number of theories that participants provided to explain the phenomena. Each 
participant received two scores, one regarding his/her prior knowledge on the history domain 
topic and the other regarding his/her prior knowledge on the science domain topic. Participants 
received a score of 0 if they did not report any theory and 1 point for each new theory they 
reported. Scores ranged from 0 to 3.  
3. Results 
3.1. Preliminary Analysis 
Data were first screened for normality. The prior knowledge variable was normally 
distributed for both the history domain topic, (M = .98, SD = .73, min/max = 0/3, skewness = .35, 
kurtosis = -.08) and the science domain topic (M = .69, SD = .79, min/max = 0/3, skewness = .85, 
kurtosis = -.087). Independent samples t-test showed that in the history domain there was no 
significant difference between evaluativists (M = 1.29, SD = .47) and multiplists (M = 1.00, SD = 
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.76), t(20) = .0.85, p = .933, between evaluativists and absolutists (M = .78, SD = .80), t(44) = 
1.940, p = .059 or between multiplists and absolutists, t(34) = .906, p = .371. In the science 
domain, no statistically significant difference in prior knowledge was observed between 
evaluativists (M = .85, SD = .67) and multiplists (M = .90, SD = .97), t(38) = -.190, p = .851, 
while statistically significant differences were observed between evaluativists and absolutists (M 
= .20, SD = .41), t(33) = 3.304, p = .002, and between multiplists and absolutists, t(33) = 2.900, p 
= .007. Statistically significant differences also were observed between adolescents and adults in 
both the history, t(50) = -4.356, p < .001 and science domain topics t(53) = -7.686, p < .001. As 
seen in Table 3, adults exhibited higher prior knowledge levels than adolescents in both the 
history and science domain topics respectively.  
The epistemic processing statement variables were not normally distributed; skewness 
ranged from 2.64 to 5.67, and kurtosis ranged from 7.52 to 34.66 and different transformations 
(arcsine, log) were not sufficient to normalize the data. The results should therefore be 
interpreted with caution given that the data were not normally distributed, although this is normal 
with think aloud data. The majority of overall statements in both domains were non-epistemic 
statements. Notably, 59.17% (SD = 39.08) and 68.76% (SD = 35.45) of the overall statements in 
the history and science domains, respectively, constitute mere repetition of the evidence.  
As seen in Table 1, the majority of participants, in both age groups and domains, were 
absolutists and multiplitists. Only one third of the participants held an evaluativist epistemic 
perspective. 
3.2. Epistemic Perspective, Age and Prior Knowledge as Predictors of Online Epistemic 
Processing 
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To examine our first research question, namely whether epistemic perspective, age and prior 
knowledge related to online epistemic processing of evidence, we conducted a multiple 
regression analysis1 on each type of epistemic statement in both the history and the science 
domains, utilizing epistemic statements as the criterion and age, epistemic perspective and prior 
knowledge as predictors. Epistemic perspective was represented by two dummy variables. Given 
the differences in number of utterances produced, percentages of usage were calculated for each 
participant in the amount of a particular type of processing out of total clauses, rather than 
frequencies.  
 3.2.1. High online epistemic statements on credibility. When evaluativists served as 
the reference group for dummy variable, the regression model, was statistically significant for 
predicting use of high epistemic statements on evidence credibility in the history domain, R2 = 
.180, F(4, 49) = 2.692, p = .042. None of the independent variables significantly predicted 
production of high epistemic statements on credibility (see Table 4a). With absolutists serving as 
the reference group or multiplists serving as the reference group, neither the regression model (R2 
= .154, F(4, 49) = 2.237, p = .079, and R2 = .142, F(4, 49) = 2.021, p = .106, respectively), nor 
the predictors were statistically significant (see Tables 4b & 4c). 
For the science topic, with evaluativists as the reference group in the dummy variables, 
the regression model was not statistically significant (R2 = .077, F(4, 50) = 1.040, p = .396, ns) 
and none of the predictors were statistically significant. The regression models with absolutists 
as the reference group or multiplists as the reference group were not statistically significant (R2 = 
.077, F (4, 50) = 1.040, p = .396 and R2 = .077, F (4, 50) = 1.040, p = .396, respectively) and 
none of the individual predictors were statistically significant (see Tables 4b & 4c). 
                                                          
1 Although the sample size of the study was quite small (N = 38), it was sufficient to secure the statistical power of 
our findings; Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) recommend a minimum of 5 participants per independent variable. 
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3.2.2. Low epistemic statements on credibility. The regression models for predicting 
use of low epistemic statements on evidence credibility, with evaluativists as the reference 
group, were not statistically significant in either the history domain (R2 = .033, F(4, 48) = .406, p 
= .803) or the science domain (R2 = .047, F(4, 50) = .610, p = .657).  Similarly, the models using 
absolutists and multiplists as the reference group were not statistically significant (R2 = .033, 
F(4, 48) = .406, p = .803; R2 = .033, F(4, 48) = .405, p = .804, for the history domain and  R2 = 
.047, F(4, 50) = .610, p = .657;  R2 = .047, F(4, 50) = .610, p = .657, for the science domain, 
respectively). None of the independent variables in the models listed above significantly 
predicted production of low epistemic statements on credibility. 
3.2.3. High epistemic statements on evidence-claim relation. When evaluativists 
served as the reference group for dummy variable, a multiple regression showed that age, 
epistemic perspective, and prior knowledge explained a statistically significant amount of the 
variance in usage of epistemic statements on evidence-claim relation in the history domain, R2 = 
.395, F(4, 49) = 8.009, p < .001. As shown in Table 5a, the two dummy variables representing 
epistemic perspective and Age were statistically significant individual predictors of usage of high 
epistemic statements on evidence-claim relation in the history domain, confirming Hypotheses 1 
and 2. With absolutists serving as the reference group, the model was also statistically 
significant, R2 = .404, F (4, 49) = 8.301, p < .001. As shown in Table 5b, age and the dummy 
variable comparing absolutists and evaluativists were statistically significant individual 
predictors. With multiplists serving as the reference group, the model was again statistically 
significant, R2 = .398, F (4, 49) = 8.110, p < .001. Age and the dummy variable comparing 
evaluatists and multiplists were statistically significant individual predictors (see Table 5c). 
Notably, in all the models only the dummy variables comparing evaluativists with multiplists or 
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with absolutists were statistically significant, while the variable comparing absolutists with 
multiplists was not statistically significant, providing further support to Hypothesis I. Adults (M 
= 4.118, SD = 5.990) showed greater usage of this particular type of epistemic statement than 
adolescents (M = .463, SD = 1.936). Also, evaluativists (M = 8.17, SD = 10.110) used more high 
epistemic statements on evidence-claim relation than multiplitists (M = 0) and absolutists (M = 
1.573, SD = 4.969).  
 When evaluativists served as the reference group for dummy variables, a multiple 
regression model for the science domain also was statistically significant (R2 = .352, F(4, 50) = 
6.776, p < .001). Age and epistemic perspective, particularly the dummy variable comparing 
multiplists versus evaluativists, were statistically significant individual predictors of the variance 
in usage of high epistemic statements on evidence-claim relation in the science domain.  
Evaluativists exhibited greater use of high epistemic statements (M = 5.860, SD = 9.682) than 
multiplists (M = 0). Also, adults (M = 7.168, SD = 9.685 produced more high epistemic 
statements than young adolescents (M = .932, SD = 3.898). With absolutists as the reference 
group for dummy variables, the regression model was statistically significant (R2 =.352, F(4, 50) 
= 6.776, p < .001) and age was a statistically significant predictor (see Table 5b). With 
multiplists as the reference group for dummy variables, the regression model was statistically 
significant (R2 =.352, F(4, 50) = 6.776, p < .001). Age and the dummy variable comparing 
multipists versus evaluativists were statistically significant predictors (see Table 5c). 
 
 
3.3. Epistemic Perspective and Prior Knowledge as Possible Mediators between Age and 
Epistemic Processing 
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To gain a better understanding of the relation between age, epistemic perspective (EP), 
prior knowledge (PK) and epistemic processing, we examined whether epistemic perspective and 
prior knowledge mediated relations between age and epistemic processing. To test the mediation 
models depicted in Figures 1-4, we used Hayes and Preacher’s (2014) PROCESS SPSS macro, 
which is recommended for mediational models with small numbers as it maintains higher levels 
of power while controlling for Type I errors (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Moreover, given that the 
bootstrapping technique expects effects to be non-normal, PROCESS was suitable for our data 
because it is based on a non-parametric distribution (Hayes & Preacher, 2014). We used 
unstandardized values for PROCESS, following Hayes’ (2013) recommendation, but 
standardized values are reported in figures for ease of interpretation. 
 







* p <.001 
Figure 1.  Mediation relations between Age, Epistemic Perspective (EP), Prior Knowledge (PK) 
and High Epistemic Statements (HES) on Credibility in the History Domain. Values shown in 
the figure are standardized for ease of interpretation.           
                                   
Path analysis was used to investigate the hypothesis that EP and PK mediate the effect of age on 
production of high epistemic statements (HES) on credibility in the social domain. The total 
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effects model was not significant, t =1.02, p = .31. For specific direct effects, results indicated 
that age was not a significant predictor of EP, b = -.19, SE = .14, p = .17, and EP was not a 
significant predictor of usage of HES on credibility, either, b = -1.25, SE = 1.12, p = .27. Age 
was a significant predictor of PK, b = .40, SE = .09, p <.001, but PK was not a significant 
predictor of HES on credibility, b = 2.79, SE =1.53, p = .07. The path coefficient for age changed 
from b = 1.32, SE = 1.30, p = .31, before the inclusion of the mediators, to b = -.02, SE = 1.06, p 
= .98, after the inclusion of the meditators. The indirect effect was tested using a bootstrap 
estimation approach with 10000 samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Results indicated that EP was 
not a significant mediator between age and credibility, CI = -.0586 ‒ 1.3746, whereas PK was a 
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Figure 2.  Mediation relations between Age, Epistemic Perspective (EP), Prior Knowledge (PK) 
and High Epistemic Statements on Credibility in the Science Domain, with standardized values. 
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     For the science domain, the total effects model was not significant, t = -.25, p = .80. Results 
indicated that age was a significant predictor of EP, b = -.25, SE = .10, p = .01, but EP was not a 
significant predictor of HES on credibility, b = -0.11, SE = .01, p = .25. Age was a significant 
predictor of PK, b = .60, SE = .08, p < .001, but PK was not a significant predictor of HES on 
credibility, b = -.01, SE = .01, p = .22. The path coefficient for age changed from before to after 
inclusion of the mediators in the model from b = -.001, SE = .004, p = .80 to b = .001, SE = .005, 
p = .73. Using a bootstrap bias-corrected estimation approach, results indicated that both EP (CI 
= .0004 - .0101) and PK (CI = -.0159 – -.0011) were significant mediators between age and HES 
on credibility. The finding that despite no statistical significance for the direct path from age to 
outcomes, or from a mediator to an outcome, the test of mediation was statistically significant 
may seem surprising. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) criteria 
for establishing mediation. However, Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) have published an article 
that demonstrate how both direct effects need not be significant, but an indirect effect can be. 
“Second, there need not be a significant ‘effect to be mediated’ in equation 2. There should be 
only one requirement to establish mediation, that the indirect effect a x b be significant.” (p. 
198). In other words, path a, the direct effect between X and M, need not be significant, nor does 
the path from M to Y (path b). This is based on the idea that indirect effects are an interaction 




3.3.2. High epistemic statements on evidence-claim relation. 








*p = .02; ** p = .05; *** p < .001 
Figure 3.  Mediation relations between Age, Epistemic Perspective (EP), Prior Knowledge (PK) 
and High Epistemic Statements (HES) on Evidence-Claim relation in the History Domain, with 
standardized values.                                             
For the history domain, the total effects model was significant, t = 2.47, p = .02. Results 
indicated that age was not a significant predictor of EP, b = -.19, SE = .14, p = .17, and EP was a 
significant predictor of HES on evidence-claim relation, b = -1.33, SE = .67, p = .05. Age was a 
significant predictor of PK, b = .40, SE = .10, p < .001, but PK was not a significant predictor of 
HES on evidence-claim relation, b = 1.26, SE = .85, p = .14. The path coefficient for age 
changed from before to after inclusion of the mediators in the model from b = 1.94, SE = .79, p = 
.02 to b = 1.19, SE = .68, p = .09. No significant mediations were found for EP CI = -.0357 ‒ 
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Figure 4.  Mediation relations between Age, Epistemic Perspective (EP), Prior Knowledge (PK) 
and High Epistemic Statements on Evidence-Claim relation in the Science Domain, with 
standardized values.                                     
For the science domain, the total effects model was significant, t = 2.18, p = .03. Results 
indicated that age was a significant predictor of EP, b = .25, SE = .10, p = .01, and that EP was a 
significant predictor of HES on evidence-claim relation, b = -1.87, SE = .86, p = .04. Age was 
also a significant predictor of PK, b = .60, SE = .08, p < .001, but PK was not a significant 
predictor of usage of HES on evidence-claim relation, b = -2.13, SE = 1.35, p = .12. The path 
coefficient for age changed from before to after inclusion of the mediators in the model from b = 
2.37, SE = 1.09,  p =.03 to b = 3.17, SE = 1.54, p = .04. For mediation, results indicated the 
indirect effect was significant when EP was the mediator, CI = .1067 ‒ 1.4415 and when PK was 
the mediator, CI = -3.5353 ‒ - .1022. These results support Hypothesis 3 that EP mediates the 
relationship between age and epistemic processing. 
3.3. Domain Differences in Online Epistemic Processing  
Comparing participants’ epistemic perspective between the history and science domains 
to address research question 2, notable differences were observed. In particular, the number of 
participants who exhibited an evaluativist epistemic perspective in the science domain (22 out of 
61) was greater than the number of participants who exhibited an evaluativist perspective in the 
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history domain (17 out of 58), X2 (1, N = 58) = 39.353, p < .001. Although the number of 
participants who exhibited a multiplist epistemic perspective was small in both domains, more 
participants were multiplists in the science domain (10 out of 61) than in the history domain (6 
out of 58). X2(1, N = 58) = 32.123, p <.001. Finally, the number of participants who exhibited an 
absolutist epistemic perspective was greater in the history domain (35 out of 58) than in the 
science domain (29 out of 61), X2(1, N = 58) = 38.114, p <.001.  
Paired samples t-test showed that participants had higher prior knowledge in the history 
topic (M = .98, SD = .73) than in the science topic (M = .71, SD = .80), t(51) = 3.083, p = .003.  
3.3.1. High online epistemic statements on credibility. A Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test 
was used to compare participants’ frequencies of high epistemic processing of evidence, 
regarding credibility of evidence, between the science and history domains. The Wilcoxon 
Signed-ranks test was used because the frequencies of high epistemic processing were not 
normally distributed. Results showed that participants engaged in more high epistemic 
processing of evidence in the history domain (M = 1.91, SD = 6.589) than in the science domain 
(M = .0074, SD = .036) (Z = -2.105, p = .035), confirming Hypothesis 4.  
3.3.2. Low online epistemic statements on credibility. A Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test 
comparing participants’ frequencies of low epistemic processing of evidence, regarding 
credibility of evidence, between the science and history domains showed that participants 
engaged also in more low epistemic processing of evidence in the history domain (M = 1.47, SD 
= 2.113) than in the science domain (M = .29, SD = .838) (Z = 4.243, p < .001). 
3.3.3. High epistemic statements on evidence-claim relation. No significant 
differences were observed between participants’ high epistemic processing of evidence regarding 
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the evidence-claim relation between the history and science domains (M = 1.788, SD = 4.285; M 
= 2.113, SD = 6.392, respectively).  
4. Discussion 
The purpose in the present study was to examine whether participants with different 
epistemic perspective process evidence differently during moment-by-moment reading of texts. 
We also examined whether there were any age or domain differences in online epistemic 
processing of evidence. Our findings suggested that individuals with evaluativist epistemic 
perspective and high levels of prior knowledge produced more high level epistemic judgments 
regarding the credibility and function of evidence in the context of an argument than did 
multiplists or absolutists. These findings are consistent with Muis’s (2007) and Kuhn’s (2001) 
theoretical frameworks and provide support for Hypothesis 1. Also, adults engaged in high 
epistemic processing of evidence more than young adolescents, supporting Hypothesis 2. When 
examined if epistemic perspective and prior knowledge had any mediation effects on the relation 
between age and epistemic processing, results only partially confirmed Hypothesis 3, showing 
that epistemic perspective and prior knowledge mediated age and epistemic processing in the 
science domain. These results showed the importance of epistemic perspective above and beyond 
age for epistemic processing. Finally, participants engaged in high epistemic processing of 
evidence in the history domain more than in the science domain, supporting Hypothesis 4. We 
discuss each of these results in more depth next. 
4.1.  Epistemic Perspective and Online Epistemic Processing 
The findings of the present study add to the growing body of evidence showing that 
evaluativist epistemic perspective supports engagement in reflective thinking (Kendeou, Muis, & 
Fulton, 2011; Mason et al., 2010; Muis & Franco, 2010; Strømsø & Bråten, 2010). Specifically, 
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the focus on the online epistemic processing of evidence employed shows that examining how 
individuals process evidence when reading a text can directly inform our understanding of how 
epistemic perspective relates to epistemic processing. Individuals with an evaluativist epistemic 
perspective tend to engage in high online epistemic processing more, reflecting on the evidence’s 
credibility and its function in providing support to its associated claim in the context of an 
argument. Therefore, our findings suggest that one’s epistemic perspective guides one’s type of 
processing (epistemic or non-epistemic), as well as level of processing (superficial versus high-
level) when reading a text. The findings are also consistent with Stømsø and colleague’s (2011) 
results showing that individuals who endorsed justification for knowing based on criteria and 
evidence were more likely to pay attention to text content when asked to evaluate a text, than 
individuals who relied on personal eyewitness experiences as the criterion for judging a text. The 
present study extends the existing literature by demonstrating that epistemic perspective not only 
influences comprehension of multiple texts (Bråten et al., 2011), but also processing of evidence 
in the context of a single text.  
The findings of the present study also add to current theoretical accounts that explain the 
relation between epistemic perspective and epistemic processing. Recall that Muis (2007) 
proposed that individuals’ beliefs translate into standards for learning as well as epistemic 
standards that serve as inputs to epistemic processing. For example, individuals who espoused 
absolutist beliefs (which she called less constructivist) may set comprehension standards (“Do I 
know this?”) that are met once a memorization of information is accomplished. From an 
epistemic processing standpoint, this results in a shallow or low-level assessment of whether 
learning has occurred. When epistemic cognition is translated into epistemic standards (e.g., 
“How do I know this?” and “Do I believe this?”), individuals with an absolutist stance readily 
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accept information presented to them when experts or authority figures provide that information 
(e.g., “It should be true, if the scientists said so”). In contrast, individuals who espouse more 
evaluativist beliefs set comprehension standards that go beyond a mere repetition of information, 
and critically evaluate that information for its veracity. Sources of that information are also 
critically evaluated and evidence compared (e.g., “This evidence is not proof”), as the results of 
the present study showed. 
Recall that Kuhn (2001) proposed that individuals with evaluativist epistemic perspective 
view alternative positions of an issue as judgments that can be compared and evaluated 
according to the criteria of argument and evidence. Previous research showed that individuals 
with different epistemic perspective used evidence differently when asked to support their 
position (Kuhn, 1991). The present study adds to the existing literature by demonstrating that 
individuals with different epistemic perspective not only use evidence differently when they 
develop arguments (Mason & Scirica, 2006), but they also process evidence differently when 
they encounter such evidence in a text. Thus, our findings contribute to our understanding of how 
epistemic perspective influences online epistemic processing of text. In particular, our findings 
showed that only individuals with evaluativist epistemic perspective are likely to engage in high 
online epistemic processing of evidence, evaluating evidence’s credibility and function in the 
context of an argument. 
Our finding that a high level of topic knowledge was associated with engagement in 
online epistemic processing is in line with prior work showing that a high level of prior 
knowledge is related to multiple-text comprehension (Ferguson & Bråten, 2013).  
4.1.1. Age differences 
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We believe that the age differences observed between epistemic perspective and online 
epistemic processing deserve careful consideration. Our findings of age-related developmental 
differences in engagement in online epistemic processing are consistent with the findings of 
other studies examining self-regulation more generally, which showed that older children and 
expert adults engaged in more self-monitoring than young children (Kitsantas & Zimmerman, 
2002; Roderer & Roebers, 2014; van der Stel & Veenman, 2010). These findings also highlight 
the importance of using a developmental approach in studying how epistemic perspective affects 
thinking.  
Notably, only half of the adult participants held evaluativist views regarding the nature of 
knowledge and knowing and those who held evaluativist views engaged in limited online 
epistemic processing of evidence. This finding is consistent with other studies showing that 
adults engage in low levels of reflective thinking (Birch & Bloom, 2007; Zhang et al., 2010) and 
suggests that maturity alone does not support engagement in high epistemic processing. Thus, 
further research is required to examine what supports development of high level epistemic 
processing. 
4.2. Domain Differences 
The differences observed in epistemic perspective across the two domains examined in 
the present study are consistent with previous work (Iordanou, 2010; Kuhn, et al., 2000; Kuhn, 
Iordanou, et al., 2008; Muis, et al., 2016; Strømsø, et al., 2011), offering further support to the 
view that epistemic cognition is domain-specific. Of particular interest are the differences 
observed in participants’ online epistemic processing of evidence. Participants overall engaged in 
online epistemic processing of evidence more in the history topic than in the science topic. This 
finding could be due to the fact that participants had better prior knowledge of the history topic 
EPISTEMIC COGNITION AND ONLINE EPISTEMIC PROCESSING 33 
than of the science topic, as indicated by the prior knowledge tests. This could be a possible 
explanation, especially considering our adult sample. The adult sample in this study consisted of 
first year graduate students who were pursuing a master’s degree in Educational Psychology. 
Most of the students held an undergraduate degree in Education or Classics, but none of them 
had a degree in the Sciences.  
Another possible explanation for the domain differences in online epistemic processing 
of evidence that we observed could be differences in epistemic evidential standards across 
domains (Chinn et al., 2011; Iordanou, 2016a). In Iordanou’s (2016a) study, when young 
adolescents were asked through a personal interview to report their views about their own and 
scientists’ process of knowing in the social and science domains, they reported that scientists 
pursue research and find evidence while they study the evidence that scientists produce in the 
science domain.  In the social domain, the majority of young adolescents in that study reported 
that the way they know about the topic and the way scientists do is the same, identifying personal 
experience and subjective thinking as the main means for knowing. Therefore, the domain 
differences observed in online epistemic processing of evidence in the present study could be due 
to differences in individuals’ epistemic cognition of evidence across domains. Specifically, 
individuals might view evidence as amenable to interpretation more so in history than in the 
science domain. Further research, using more sensitive instruments assessing particularly 
students’ epistemic cognition of evidence and evidential standards across different domains, is 
needed to investigate this possibility.     
4.3. Educational Implications and Future Research 
The present findings, as well as others (Muis et al., 2011), showed that individuals 
generally exhibited little engagement in epistemic thinking about the justification employed in a 
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text to support a position. We believe this is concerning, considering the important role of critical 
evaluation in the 21st century (NGSS Lead States, 2013). Yet, for those individuals who engaged 
in epistemic processing, the determining factors were an evaluativist epistemic perspective along 
with high topic knowledge. This finding has important educational implications. Justification of 
one’s own knowledge, which is central in epistemic perspective (Bråten et al., 2011; Greene, 
Muis, & Pieschl, 2010), guides how we process evidence when reading a text. Thus, investing in 
developing students’ epistemic perspective, through interventions such as Muis and Duffy’s 
(2013) constructivist teaching practices, and Iordanou and Constantinou’s (2015) argumentation 
practices, appears to be a promising pathway for supporting students to develop their reflective 
thinking during reading. We recommend that future research examine the effect of interventions 
that aim to support the development of epistemic perspective on students’ online epistemic 
processing when reading a text.   
Furthermore, more work is required to understand better the relation between epistemic 
perspective and epistemic processing.  Further research is required that includes a more diverse 
sample. In addition, the possible effect of the evidence’s representation format (Muis et al, 
2011), individuals’ characteristics such as epistemic aims and values (Chinn, et al., 2011), as 
well as the role of affect when conflicting texts are used needs to be examined (see Muis, 
Pekrun, Sinatra, Azevedo, Trevors, Meier & Heddy, 2015). There is also a need to find more 
sensitive measures for accessing epistemic processing. In the present work, and even though 
think-alouds revealed participants’ epistemic processing, the frequency of those processes was 
low. This, may be due, in part, to the methodology itself, as think-alouds only reveal a subset of 
processes that individuals are aware of; individuals, however, also engage in processes they are 
not aware of. 
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Nevertheless, the present work examining epistemic perspectives and epistemic 
processing, is a first attempt in bridging the more traditional frameworks of epistemology with 
the recent call for studying epistemic activity in action (Iordanou, 2016b) and situated epistemic 
cognition (Clark et al., 2011). Studying online epistemic processing can provide enlightening 
insights on individuals’ epistemic ideals and reliable processes of knowing, that is the standards 
people employ for knowing and what they perceive as reliable means to know respectively 
(Chinn & Rinehart, 2016), and even more importantly it can be a promising way to study how 
individuals’ epistemic standards change (Iordanou, 2016b). Developing critical thinkers is 
probably one of the most important but also most challenging objectives in education (NGSS 
Lead States, 2013). Thus, gaining a deeper understanding of the development of critical 
evaluation during reading is, we believe, a worthwhile research endeavor. 
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Table 1 
Participants’ Epistemic Perspective by Age and Domain  
                                                  History Domain                                     Science Domain 






Absolutists Multiplists   Evaluativists 
Middle & 
High         
 School 
Students                 
57% 
(N = 20) 
15% 
(N = 5) 
28% 
(N = 10) 
43% 
(N = 16) 
24% 
(N = 9) 
33% 





(N = 15) 
4% 
(N = 1) 
29% 
(N = 7) 
54% 
(N = 13) 
4% 
(N = 1) 
42% 
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Table 2 
Types of Statements after Reading a piece of Evidence in the History and Science Texts.  
 
         Types                                                                     Example                            Overall  
                                                                                                                                percent usage 
                                                                                                                          (Standard Deviation)  
 
                                                                                                               History Text     Science Text 
 
                                        
HIGH ONLINE EPISTEMIC PROCESSING OF EVIDENCE- EMPLOYING THE 
EPISTEMIC STANDARD OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
 
A. Judging Evidence (focus on evidence itself)            
Comments regarding:  
 
  
I. Credibility of evidence, which is justified 
by                       
a.  The number of scientific studies. 
                         
b. Methodology (Scientific 
methodology).  
                         
 
 
There are many 
studies supporting 
this. 










II. Persuasiveness of evidence                                                                                     
Reference to whether evidence is 
convincing or not convincing, along with 
a justification. 
 
Based on research it
provides a convincing 
evidence. 
 
0.13% (1.03) 0.0% (0) 
III. Rightness of the evidence                                                                                        
Evaluation of the evidence in terms of 
right/wrong, along with a justification. 
This should be true;
carbon dioxide was 
released (in the 
atmosphere) which 
caused an increase in 
the temperate and 
the animals could 
not survive. 
0.0% (0) 0.0 % (0) 
 
HIGH ONLINE EPISTEMIC PROCESSING 
OF EVIDENCE – CLAIM RELATION 
 
B. Judging evidence-claim relation.                                             
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Comments regarding whether the evidence supports 
the claim that was supposed to support, the suitability 
of evidence in the context of argument and whether 
the evidence enhances claim’s persuasiveness. 
 





LOW ONLINE EPISTEMIC PROCESSING OF EVIDENCE- EMPLOYING EPISTEMIC 
STANDARDS OTHER THAN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OR NO STANDARDS  
 
      A. Comments regarding 
 
I. Credibility of evidence, which is justified by                          
a. Authority alone, without any attempt for 
evaluation.                     
b. Rule of majority. The majority of scientists 
support this.   
c. First-hand Experience. It is an eyewitness 
account. 
           
 
 
It should be true, if 
the scientists said so. 
 
Three researchers 
support that the lost 
island of Atlantis is 
in Santorini. 
1.77% (5.44) .71% (3.86) 
 
II. Persuasiveness of evidence                                                     
Reference to whether evidence is convincing or not                 




.13% (1.03) .62% (3.44) 
III. Rightness of the evidence                                               
Evaluation of the evidence in terms of right/wrong, 
 with no justification. 
This is right. 2.52% (9.08) 1.32% (4.37) 
 
B. General comments with no explanation.                        
              
 
This is interesting. 
5.22% (9.67) 10.05% (20.46) 
 
 
C. Reference to personal knowledge                             
             
 
 
I have read this 
somewhere, I know 
this 
7.20% (16.50) 5.23% (12.14) 
  
NON-EPISTEMIC COGNITIVE PROCESSING  
 
I. Repeat the evidence                       
                                  
Here it says about the 
habitats of the island 
and how the island got 
its name. 
59.17% (39.08) 68.76% (35.45) 
II. Ask for clarification regarding the evidence                     
                
How cold was it? 2.41% (5.34) 3.01% (8.58) 
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Table 3  
Means and Standard Deviations of Prior Knowledge by Epistemic Cognition, Age and Topic. 
 
 Epistemic Cognition Age 













(N = 35) 
1.00 (.76) 
(N = 6) 
1.29 (.47) 
(N = 17) 
.71 (.63) 
(N = 35) 
1.50 (.62) 






(N = 29) 
 
.90 (.97) 
(N = 10) 
   
.85 (.67) 
(N = 22) 
 
.28 (.51) 
(N = 37) 
 
1.47 (.61) 
































Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on High Epistemic Processing on Credibility, using Epistemic Cognition, Prior Knowledge 
and Age as predictors, by Domain. 
 History Domain  Science Domain 
Variable B SE B β p  B SE B β p 
EP          
absolutists versus evaluativists -4.450 2.699 -.250 .106  -.021 .013 -.260 .121 
multiplists versus evaluativists -6.647 3.622 -.266 .073  -.018 .011 -.238 .132 
Age   .451 1.408  .048 .750    .003 .008  .083 .692 
PK 2.916 1.947  .232 .141  -.009 .009 -.207 .304 
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Table 4b 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on High Epistemic Processing on Credibility, using Epistemic Cognition, Prior Knowledge 
and Age as predictors, by Domain. 
 History Domain  Science Domain 
Variable B SE B β p  B SE B β p 
EP          
evaluativists versus absolutists 2.898 2.712 .149 .290  .021 .013 .281 .121 
multiplists versus absolutists -2.949 3.422 -.118 .393  .003 .014 .043 .819 
Age .621 1.425 .067 .665  .003 .008 .083 .692 
PK 3.328 1.949 .265 .094  -.009 .009 -.207 .304 
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Table 4c 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on High Epistemic Processing on Credibility, using Epistemic Cognition, Prior Knowledge 
and Age as predictors, by Domain. 
 History Domain  Science Domain 
Variable B SE B β p  B SE B β p 
EP          
evaluativists versus multiplists 3.514 3.489 .181 .319  .018 .011 .238 .132 
absolutists versus multiplists -.048 3.281 -.003 .988  -.003 .014 -.040 .819 
Age .589 1.442 .063 .685  .003 .008 .083 .692 
PK 3.249 1.982 .258 .108  -.009 .009 -.207 .304 
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 Table 5a 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on High Epistemic Processing of Evidence-claim Relation, using Epistemic Cognition, 
Prior Knowledge and Age as predictors, by Domain. 
 History Domain  Science Domain 
Variable B SE B β p  B SE B β p 
EP       
 
  
absolutists versus evaluativists -5.372 1.948 -.359 .008  -2.700 1.780 -.210   .136 
multiplists versus evaluativists -7.541 2.614 -.359 .006  -5.608 1.555 -.471   .001 
Age  2.369 1.016  .303 .024   4.059      1.050  .674 <.001 
PK  1.769 1.405  .167 .214  -2.224 1.223 -.304   .075 
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Table 5b 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on High Epistemic Processing of Evidence-claim Relation, using Epistemic Cognition, 
Prior Knowledge and Age as predictors, by Domain. 
 History Domain  Science Domain 
Variable B SE B β p  B SE B β p 
EP       
 
  
multiplists versus absolutists -2.356 2.414 -.112 .334  -2.908 1.861 -.244 .124 
evaluativists versus absolutists 5.551 1.913 .339 .006  2.700 1.780 .227 .136 
Age 2.543 1.005 .325 .015  4.059 1.050 .674 .000 
PK 2.033 1.375 .192 .146  -2.224 1.223 -.304 .075 
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Table 5c 
 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on High Epistemic Processing of Evidence-claim Relation, using Epistemic Cognition, 
Prior Knowledge and Age as predictors, by Domain. 
 History Domain  Science Domain 
Variable B SE B β p  B SE B β p 
EP       
 
  
multiplists versus absolutists 1.614 2.308 .108 .488  2.908 1.861 .226 .124 
multiplists versus evaluativists 7.202 2.454 .440 .005  5.608 1.555 .471 .001 
Age 2.590 1.015 .331 .014  4.059 1.050 .674 .000 
PK 2.114 1.394 .200 .136  -2.224 1.223 -.304 .075 
Note. EP: Epistemic perspective, PK: Prior-Knowledge. Epistemic perspective was represented by two dummy variables with multiplists serving as the reference 
group. 
 
 
